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ABSTRACT 
 
The Modigliani-Miller theorem serves as the standard finance paradigm on corporate capital structure 
and managerial decision making. Implicitly, it is assumed that the market possesses full information about 
the firm. However, if firm managers have insider information, they may attempt to 'signal' changes in the 
firm’s financial structure and, in competitive equilibrium, shareholders will draw deductions from such 
signals. Empirical work shows that the value of underlying firms rises with leverage because investors 
expect such firms to implement positive NPV projects. We empirically examine this view using a sample 
of debt issue announcements by publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. We argue that 
the timing of debt issues is fundamental in determining the relationship between leverage and risk-
adjusted returns. We show that an announcing firm's intrinsic value may not rise depending on when 
management publicly 'signals' changes in their firm's capital structure. Specifically, we show that risk-
adjusted returns rise positively for firms that make debt announcements during normal economic 
conditions while they tend to decline for firms making debt announcements during recessionary periods. 
During recessionary periods, market risk and loss aversion rise and investors focus less on the potential 
growth of debt announcing firms and focus more on potential losses instead. We conclude that the timing 
of new debt is of paramount importance and managers' inability to prudently time such announcements 
can lead to exacerbated levels of systematic risk coupled with a significant erosion in shareholder wealth. 
 
Keywords: Debt announcements; risk-return tradeoff; Modigliani-Miller; bivariate EGARCH. 
JEL classification: G12; G14; G30; G32 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Debt announcements provide rich information to investors and other stakeholders. In the context of the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem on the irrelevancy of capital structure on firm valuation, outside investors and 
inside managers have access to the same information regarding the firm's current earnings and its future 
investment opportunity set. If, however, inside managers possess more information than outside investors, 
then there exists a degree of information asymmetry. Such information asymmetry can increase or decrease 
stochastically across time and, as we show here, is linked to the general mood in the market and economic 
conditions at large. In fact, it is not uncommon for inside managers to use various corporate announcements as 
a means of 'signalling' to the market with the aim to reduce information asymmetries. For example, a firm may 
announce unexpectedly large dividends, especially during hard economic times, in order to signal that it is in 
strong financial health. In a similar vein, managers may use debt announcements as a tool to signal to investors 
that their firm is seeking out positive net present value (NPV) projects that can enhance the total value of the 
firm. 
Given the barrier of information asymmetry separating inside managers from outside investors (e.g., 
Akerlof, 1970), the overriding question is, are debt announcements construed as a positive or negative signal 
by investors? This question is not easy to answer given the multiple layers of competing benefits and costs 
linked with debt announcements, including tax shield benefits, investment opportunities that can be pursued, 
costs incurred by augmenting financial distress measures and agency costs arising due to conflicting interests 
between bondholders and stockholders.  
Theoretical predictions as to how markets construe debt announcements have been mixed ever since the 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem on the irrelevancy of firm capital structure on price valuation. Miller 
(1977) shows that this proposition ought to hold in the presence of taxes. Ross (1977) posits a signalling model 
whereby rises in leverage are linked with rises in the market's perception of the underlying firm's value, due 
to the fact that inside managers possess more complete information about their firm's growth opportunities 
than do outside investors.1 Debt announcements can serve to mitigate this information asymmetry and can be 
used to signal managerial optimism regarding their firm's investment opportunity set and earnings prospects. 
From an empirical perspective, there are two inextricable parameters of interest that can be dissected from the 
time series of the announcing firms' stock price data, which help answer the question of whether debt 
announcements send a positive or negative signal: the respective underlying firms' risk and returns. As 
discussed at greater length in the second section of this paper, the literature is focused almost exclusively on 
ensuing returns following debt announcements. The universal methodological treatment applied stems from 
the single-period CAPM or some market-model variant and utilizes abnormal returns (AR) or cumulative 
                                                          
1 Ross (1973; 1977) posits a model whereby leverage signals firm quality and the presence of positive NPV projects. According to Ross, 
firms of high quality have the ability to meet their periodic interest payments throughout the life of their bonds. Thus, they are more apt 
at raising funds in order to invest in positive NPV projects which will enhance future earnings. On the flip side, firms of low quality do 
not have the capacity to sustain such interest payments.  
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abnormal returns (CAR) in order to draw inferences as to what happens to shareholder wealth before and after 
a debt announcement. 
For reasons which we build upon more analytically later on in this paper, we argue that single period AR 
approaches give a myopic view of the whole picture of debt announcements and their impact on shareholder 
wealth. Using a bivariate EGARCH, we estimate time-varying betas and risk-adjusted time-varying returns for 
a sample of publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). We proceed to examine the beta 
risk of these firms and show that debt issue announcements generally lead to a rise in the betas. We 
subsequently examine how the risk-return relationship changes during normal economic conditions and 
during recessionary periods. Overall, we show that rises in beta risk are markedly more pronounced when 
aggregate economic sentiment is low (and during our recession sample). Interestingly, alphas (or risk-adjusted 
returns) increase along with betas only during normal economic conditions. During recessionary periods when 
beta risk rises more significantly, alphas have a tendency to decline. 
Thus, the following themes emerge from our findings. On average, the betas of announcing firms usually 
rise in varying degrees across time windows following the announcement of a new debt issue. In the five days 
following the announcement, betas rise by approximately 10% and by about 14% in the 6- to 30-day window 
following the announcement. They continue to rise steadily until 99 days following the announcement, 
suggesting an important upward shift in the systematic risk of announcing firms. When we split the sample on 
the timing that the event takes place, the betas of firms that issue debt during normal economic periods rise 
significantly less than those of firms issuing debt during recessionary periods. Interestingly, the time-varying 
alphas (risk-adjusted returns) of firms making debt announcements during normal economic times rise 
steadily in the days both preceding and following the announcement date. Conversely, during recessionary 
periods time-varying alphas experience a precipitous decline and even take on negative values in the three 
months following the announcement. Finally, in line with the alpha-beta relationship of the two sub-samples, 
we find that firms whose management opted to make debt announcements during normal economic times 
display steadily rising time-varying Treynor ratios following the announcement (evidence of a positive risk-
return tradeoff). On the other hand, those firms that made debt announcements during recessionary periods 
displayed negative time-varying Treynor ratios in the two and three months following the announcement 
(evidence of a negative risk-return tradeoff).  
Such an asymmetry in the time path behavior of beta indicates that economic conditions play a large role 
in investors' response to debt issue announcements. It also suggests that the undesirable effects of information 
asymmetry are exacerbated during bad economic times and when investor sentiment is generally low. While 
during normal economic times investors may be more tolerant to risk and more optimistically receptive to debt 
announcements, we show that there is an opposite effect during recessionary periods. Declining alpha (while 
beta rises) suggests that investors focus more on the risk increase and less to the potential future prospects of 
the firm. 
Overall, our findings are in line with behavioral arguments that if investors suffer losses from their risky 
portfolios, they increase their loss-aversion and/or ambiguity-aversion which lead to revaluation of the asset 
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price lower than the risk taking (e.g., see Barberis, 2011; Cabeller and Krishnamurthy, 2008). Hence, during 
recessionary times, issuing new debt may not be received by investors as a signal for prosperous growth 
opportunities, but it may instead be perceived negatively and trigger an adverse market reaction.  
We contribute to the literature in various ways. First, this paper may serve to reconcile the conflicting 
evidence regarding the behavior of stock prices following debt announcements. As described in more detail in 
the second section of this paper, some find that investors react positively to debt announcements while others 
react negatively. For the past several decades, there is no agreement in event study literature as to what the 
effects of debt announcements are. Second, our findings shed light onto the role of information asymmetry. 
While event studies evoke the notion of information asymmetry in order to reconcile conflicting findings and 
to demonstrate that stock prices can be 'noisy' and difficult to decode following debt announcements, we show 
that the negative effects of information asymmetry are exacerbated during hard economic times when investor 
sentiment is low. Outside investors may become more apprehensive toward debt announcements and, in the 
words of Akerlof (1970), ask themselves whether the underlying firm is selling peaches or lemons. In other 
words, do inside managers really have positive NPV opportunities that can enhance future earnings, or, will the 
proceeds from this debt go to suboptimal uses and only serve to raise financial distress costs? Our findings 
concur that the betas of announcing firms during a recessionary period rise acutely relative to those that make 
debt announcements during normal economic conditions. 
Finally, in an innovation relative to existing event study literature, our paper provides a more complete 
picture of stock price behavior in the days surrounding debt announcements. We do so by estimating time-
varying betas, in order to construct time series of underlying firms' Treynor ratios. This approach is somewhat 
unique in asset pricing and event study literature, and permits the examination of risk-return dynamics across 
time by relaxing the restrictive assumption that risk and return are constant across time.2  
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. The second section provides a review of literature 
that serves as a motivational underpinning for our paper. The third section describes the nature of the sampled 
data, estimation methods and empirically testable specifications we consider. The fourth section details the 
findings of our article and reports how the risk-return dynamics of announcing firms' common stock can be 
interpreted. Finally, the fifth section summarizes and concludes this paper. 
 
 
2. MOTIVATIONAL LITERATURE & DEVELOPMENT OF ARGUMENTS 
 
2.1. Theories on market efficiency, signalling and information asymmetry 
                                                          
2 Such a restrictive assumption may yield misspecified parameter estimates since casual observation of financial markets, as well as 
theoretical work, establish that financial time series exhibit time-varying risk-return dynamics. As mentioned, the majority of event study 
literature which investigates the impact of debt announcements has exclusively focused on CAR computations in the days following such 
announcements ˗  a technique that explicitly utilizes 'static' or 'single-period' market-type models (e.g., the CAPM) and which do not allow 
for time variation in beta risk. 
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Firms face a complex set of choices when deciding how to finance their operations. Traditionally, there exists a 
conflict of interest between bondholders and stockholders given that the nature of their stakes in the firm is 
fundamentally different. Bondholders typically prefer risk-averse strategies since this maximizes the likelihood 
of them recouping their investment. Stockholders, on the other hand, are more likely to prefer risky projects as 
this means higher potential rewards. There is a flip side to this as well. If the size of debt grows in relation to 
equity value, stockholders may end up shouldering the volatility associated with uncertainty over whether the 
firm can repay this debt or whether there are any contractual stipulations in place prohibiting it from 
undertaking certain risky projects. This presents some serious considerations that management needs to 
account for when deciding how to finance their operations. 
Assuming market efficiency, it should not matter how a firm decides to finance its operations. Classical 
asset pricing theory posits that, in an efficient market, the economic information content surrounding 
corporate events such as debt issue announcements should have no impact on expected returns (Fama, 1991; 
Friedman, 1953; Yen and Lee, 2008). This is because such risk is diversifiable and the information content of 
the event is already incorporated into the stock's price. Similarly, the Modigliani and Miller (1958) 'irrelevance 
proposition' posits that capital structure changes should have no effect on firms' stock prices.  
However, the notion that markets are efficient is called to question. Behavioral finance studies 
demonstrate that there is no current consensus that prices move in accordance with the market efficiency 
hypothesis, especially in light of evidence suggesting that arbitrageurs are constrained in terms of their abilities 
to fight mispricing given that their resources may be limited (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) or because they cannot 
coordinate and synchronize their efforts in order to become a stronger driving force in the market to correct 
such mispricing (Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2002; 2003). Among other reasons, Wurgler and Zhuravskaya 
(2002) argue that stocks are imperfect substitutes of each other and it is thus difficult to eliminate their risk. 
Such risk may stem from mispricing or event-induced phenomena such as, in the case of our paper, debt issue 
announcements. Casual observation also does not support the notion of market efficiency, especially if we 
consider the plethora of hedge funds and active money managers that earn their living scanning the market 
looking for corporate events in order to set up speculative positions.  
 The notion that markets are efficient is also very restrictive from the perspective of signalling theory in 
finance and management. According to Spence (1973), there are intrinsic differences between the degree of 
information one party possesses over the other party of the transaction. From the perspective of event studies, 
outside investors realize that they possess less information that insiders and, thus, outside investors are 
constantly gleaning pieces of news or corporate announcements in order to infer such information. Although 
the truth will come out eventually, shareholders are, naturally, averse to unduly high levels of risk which can 
adversely affect their portfolios in the short- and medium-term. 
 Signalling theory is concerned with decreasing the degree of information asymmetry between two parties 
involved in a transaction (Spence, 2002) and its use to explain corporate events is gaining momentum in areas 
such as corporate management, human resource management and entrepreneurship, as well as into the fields 
of finance, organizational science and accounting (Connelly et al., 2011). It is evident that inside managers 
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know more about the firm and its future prospects than do outside investors (Anderson and Prezas, 2003; Chen 
et al., 2004; Wu and Lee, 2008; Shaw, 2012; Gangopadhyay et al., 2014; Koutmos, 2016; Milian, 2016). In the 
words of Stiglitz (2002, p.469), information asymmetries result when "different people know different things." 
Stiglitz (2000) identifies two types of information where asymmetry can arise: i) information regarding quality 
and ii) information regarding intent. For example, management studies examine how CEOs can signal 
unobservable qualities about their firm's future potential via their financial statements (Zhang and Wiersema, 
2009). In entrepreneurship literature, Certo (2003) examines whether board characteristics provide valuable 
signals to outside investors. Other studies extend signalling theory to investigate whether the presence of 
venture capitalists and angel investors (Elitzur and Gavious, 2003) and the involvement of firm founders 
(Busenitz et al., 2005) provide outsiders with any signals as to the value of the firm. 
 Despite the growth in signalling theory, it is yet to be applied empirically to a wide range of corporate 
events, such as the announcement of new debt issues. In the context of debt issue announcements, investors 
may negatively perceive debt announcements because they question the quality of the firm's investment 
opportunities (i.e., efficient use of funds to implement positive NPV projects) or, more generally speaking, the 
debt’s overall intent and purpose (Chen and Su, 2010; Carayannopoulos and Nayak, 2013). Our main research 
question is: How do outside investors interpret new debt issue announcements? Although, as Ross (1973; 
1977) posits, this event ought to correlate with a rise in firm value, this may not always be the case if investors 
interpret this information negatively. We argue herein (and show empirically) that, in line with the opponents 
of market efficiency, betas following debt issue announcements shift significantly as the company’s risk 
changes. 
 
2.2. Debt issue announcements 
Recent articles examine the behavior of stock prices following debt issue announcements. In general, the 
consensus is that debt issue announcements lead to negative AR and with rises in price variance. Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1999) examine US firm data and report significant long-run post-issue underperformance 
following straight and convertible debt offerings. Lewis et al. (2000; 2002), also examining US firm data, report 
that firms making convertible debt offerings experience poor long-run stock price performance and there is a 
rise in the sample firms' risk profile. Most recently, Zeidler et al. (2012) also report findings for the US market 
by analyzing the impact of convertible bond offerings and seasoned equity offerings, documenting rises in 
firms' risk profile prior to the date of issuance of both events. Moving away from the US stock market, Amman 
and Seiz (2006) examine the announcement effects of convertible and exchangeable bond offerings in the Swiss 
and German markets and also find negative AR following the announcement. 
We first contribute to this literature by investigating all types of debt in the UK for which evidence is 
sparse, after controlling for various issue-specific, firm-specific and market-related factors. By controlling for 
these factors we are able to disentangle the impact of the actual debt announcement itself and test whether this 
serves as a 'leverage up' signal, increasing the firm's systematic risk. We argue that a rise in systematic risk 
(i.e., beta) following a debt increase may reflect stockholders' angst with respect to the firm's ability to shoulder 
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more debt. It may also reflect a conflict of interest between existing stockholders and new bondholders. 
Specifically, to some extent, existing stockholders have an incentive for the firm to undertake relatively riskier 
projects which bondholders may be risk averse to, and while stockholders can sell their shares in the event 
these projects become unsuccessful, bondholders may be exposed to prolonged periods of credit risk. 
Bondholders may also establish contractual stipulations restricting the level of risk the underlying firm can 
undertake or may demand higher interest payments as compensation for the increased risk. From the 
perspective of the underlying firm, this leads to a rise in its cost of capital and, to some extent, hinders its ability 
to earn 'spectacular' upside rewards which stockholders yearn for. 
Second, we take a step further compared to the even-study literature that focuses on risk-adjusted returns 
without considering contemporaneous risk changes, and attempt to answer a natural question that begs for an 
explanation: What happens to risk-adjusted returns in the presence of rising betas? An answer to this question 
carries implications for the risk-return tradeoff for investors who choose to hold stock in firms that make debt 
issues announcements. There is a burgeoning body of literature that attempts to explore the risk-return 
relation on the market portfolio. The evidence thus far is mixed and there is no consensus as to the sign and 
magnitude of the risk-return tradeoff. Some report a positive risk-return tradeoff while others find a 
statistically weak or negative risk-return tradeoff (French et al., 1987; Glosten et al., 1993; Nelson, 1991; 
Koutmos, 2012). A negative tradeoff appears to be irreconcilable from the viewpoint that we are rational risk-
averse individuals  and that higher betas ought to be associated with higher expected returns (Koutmos, 2015).  
Moreover, inferences drawn from traditional event studies are based on single-period models such as the 
CAPM or the market model. This procedure is problematic, as it assumes equity risk to be time-invariant across 
plausible time frames such as day-to-day or week-to-week; an assumption which does not hold. We conjecture 
that a broader view is needed. We argue that the application of a bivariate EGARCH model is more appropriate, 
especially considering that volatility changes asymmetrically across time. 
 Our bivariate EGARCH model allows for time-varying betas and time-varying alphas, which will also allow 
the time series construction of announcing firms' Treynor ratios. This approach is somewhat unique in asset 
pricing and event study literature, and permits the examination of risk-return dynamics across time by relaxing 
the restrictive assumption that risk and return are constant across time periods (an assumption that may yield 
misspecified parameter estimates).  
 
2.3. The role of economic recessions 
How an economic recession - and a period of declining sentiment in general - can influence investors' reactions 
to debt issue announcements is yet to be examined rigorously in extant literature. Specifically, there is an 
increasing body of literature that deals with the role of investor sentiment on market reactions to the arrival of 
price-sensitive information. The empirical evidence supports the view that markets tend to penalize 'bad' news 
more during periods of low sentiment and pessimism than during periods of optimism. For example, Mian and 
Sankaraguruswamy (2012) investigate the effect of market-wide optimism and pessimism on market reactions 
to firm-specific announcements in the US market and conclude that sentiment materially moves stock price 
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responses in the direction of such sentiment: the impact of 'bad' news is accentuated in the presence of 
pessimistic sentiment. This evidence is corroborated in a variety of other contexts. Bozos et al. (2011), and 
references therein, show that the general economic climate can affect the way investors perceive corporate 
dividends and earnings. Baker and Wurgler (2006; 2007) show that, on aggregate, investor sentiment is a 
significant determinant of stock returns whereby investor optimism is associated with rising prices and vice 
versa. More recently, Brown et al. (2012) suggest that during periods of economic optimism, firm 
management's accounting disclosures are less likely to be evaluated rigorously by outside investors. All of the 
above support the view that underlying investor sentiment may play an important role in influencing how the 
market reacts to the disclosure of corporate news. 
Information asymmetry is an omnipresent force in financial markets and, in some respects, reflects the 
degree to which there is divergence of opinion among outside investors regarding the future prospects of a 
firm. Empirical research, in a variety of contexts, supports the view that the negative connotations associated 
with information asymmetry can exacerbate during recessions and thereby raise the probability that the 
market reacts negatively to various firm announcements or news disclosures. Ceteris paribus, an otherwise 
well-received announcement made during normal economic times may be negatively construed during times 
of market upheaval. This is, a priori, to be expected because investors are psychologically in a state of flux 
during bad economic times and more nervous about the prospects of losing their investments. 
Empirical studies also support the notion that aversion towards risk can rise when the prospects of losing 
also rise. In their seminal piece, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) delineate the principle of loss aversion, which 
highlights the human tendency to strongly prefer avoiding possible losses than to attaining gains of equal 
magnitude. During recessionary periods, when the probability of losses rises across asset classes, investors 
become more sensitized to informational asymmetries and the possibility of diminishes in their wealth. 
Therefore, they are more prone to questioning the quality and intent of a firm's management (i.e., they are 
more likely to ask whether the firm's management is selling them peaches or lemons, or whether proceeds 
raised from the new debt issue will be effectively used in implementing positive NPV projects). Thus, an 
otherwise benign piece of news or announcement may trigger an adverse market reaction during bad economic 
times. 
It remains unexplored whether the overall economic environment can exacerbate information asymmetry 
and can lead outside investors to negatively value a firm that makes a debt issue announcement. We thus 
contribute to extant literature and pose the following empirical question: Does the economic environment play 
a role in explaining the risk-return relationship? We conjecture that periods of optimism (when the economy 
is in a growth stage) and periods of pessimism (when the economy is in a recessionary stage) affect outside 
investor sensitivity to information asymmetry differently. We argue that the risk-return tradeoff of debt 
announcing firms' common stock will differ following debt announcements depending on economic conditions. 
Thus, it is natural for betas to rise relatively more when debt issue announcements take place in 
recessionary periods than when announcements take place during normal market conditions. This is because, 
consistent with the rationale of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), negative effects of information asymmetry can 
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be exacerbated during bad economic times when investor sentiment is low, as outside investors become more 
apprehensive toward debt announcements. In other words, during recessionary periods, investors will focus 
more on the intent and quality of debt announcements. They may also question the extent to which such debt 
will go toward positive NPV projects. In this case, a negative relation between risk and adjusted returns is to 
be expected. Such a result would also go against the conjectures put forth by Ross (1973; 1977) but would shed 
more light onto how outside investors react during debt announcements made in bad economic times. On the 
contrary, during normal economic conditions, investors are more likely to believe that inside managers have 
positive NPV opportunities indeed, and the funds will be used to enhance future earnings. In this case, a positive 
relation between risk and adjusted returns is to be expected.  
 
3. SAMPLE DATA & ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1. Nature of data sample 
To ascertain the impact of debt issue announcements on the risk-return dynamics of underlying firms we 
sample the FTSE 100 constituents, which represent the highest capitalization and most liquid stocks in the UK. 
Such companies are arguably well-established with high visibility, representing the 'blue chips' of the LSE. A 
sample of debt issue announcements from FTSE 100 companies is manually retrieved by scanning through 
daily news announcements from the LSE’s Regulatory News Service (RNS). We carefully identify the very first 
official announcement about a company's decision to issue new debt. Announcements made by companies' 
subsidiaries are excluded from the sample.  
All the announcements in the final sample are uncontaminated by other firm-specific and price-sensitive 
events, such as dividend and earnings announcements, sales announcements, analyst forecasts, mergers and 
acquisitions, top management changes, and the like. The final sample (shown in table 1) comprises of 194 debt 
issue announcements during the period spanning January 1, 2003 through December 31, 2010; a seven-year 
horizon that captures the events of mid-2007, which marked the beginning of the most recent financial 
recession that economists now refer to as the 'great recession.’  
Figure 1 illustrates a time series plot of the FTSE 100 index with dots denoting respective announcements, 
alongside the UK Economic Sentiment Indicator (UKESI), which is derived from combined business tendency 
surveys and is published by the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (European Commission, 
2011). The vertical line through August 9, 2007 marks the beginning of the great recession, or so-called 'credit 
crunch,' whereby short-term money markets froze leading the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve 
to inject emergency liquidity into global financial markets. 
The total value of the raised debt during this period exceeds £156 billion, representing over 10% of the 
FTSE 100 market capitalization and over 7.5% of entire LSE equity market value as of 2012.   
[Insert table 1 about here] 
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
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3.2. Estimation of abnormal returns (AR) 
Consistent with extant event study literature, it is of interest to compute 'static' AR for our sampled firms in 
order to gain a preliminary understanding of price behavior before and after firms' announcement of a debt 
issue. Following Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Slovin et al. (2000) and the majority of event studies (see e.g., 
Strong, 1992), we employ the familiar single-period market model as a benchmark for measuring the value 
effect of new debt issue announcements. We regress the logarithmic returns of each security (Rit) against those 
of the FTSE 100 market index (Rmt) for an estimation period of 90 days (T-100, T-11) prior to the event day, T0, 
and estimate the return residuals eit for the period T-5 to T+5 for all 194 events in our sample: 
)Rmβα( ReAR tiiititit
ˆˆ 
           (1)
 
Based on (1), we measure average abnormal returns (AAR) and average standardized abnormal returns 
(ASAR) for the various time windows, as well as the average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) and average 
cumulative standardized returns (ACSAR) for three event windows around T0. We also report the standardized 
cross sectional (SCS) test, which is a hybrid test of the Patell standardized residual (PSR) test (Patell, 1976). 
This test adjusts the residuals for forecast error and prevents large variance observations from dominating the 
test but is more robust when event-induced variance is present. The test for day t is as follows: 
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where SARit is the standardized abnormal return for security i at day t, ?̅?𝑚𝑡 is the mean market return during 
the whole period (T-110, T+10), and ?̅?𝑚𝑡∗ denotes the mean market return during the estimation period (T-110, T-
11)The appropriate test statistic for the abnormal cumulative standardized returns for a period L within the 
event period is: 
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, and L is equivalent to the number of 
days within the period. 
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Finally, we employ a binomial sign test, which (as a test of location) is not influenced by positive or 
negative outliers and can thus act as a reliable non-parametric robustness procedure (McConnell and 
Muscarella, 1985). The z-statistic for this test is:   
          𝑍 = (𝑝 − 𝑛𝑟)/√𝑛(1 − 𝑟)𝑟,           (5) 
whereby p is the number of positive returns during the event period, n is total number of returns during the 
same period and r is the percentage of positive returns during the estimation period (51.54%). 
 
3.3. Economic recession and control variables 
To test the role of the economic environment on the AR surrounding debt issue announcements, we employ 
the dummy variable RECESS, which equals 0 for all announcements prior to August 9, 2007 (N=109) and 1 for 
the following observations (N=85). To validate the results under a more robust setting, we also employ the UK 
Economic Sentiment Indicator (UKESI), to examine the role of general economic sentiment on the market's 
reaction to debt issue announcements. 
To control for anticipated effects by known AR determinants, we employ three vectors of issue-specific, 
firm-specific and market-related control variables. For issue-specific variables, we use LOGDEBT, the natural 
logarithm of the debt value to control for the size effect of equity issues on stock price movements; EURO is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the debt was issued in Euros and is 0 otherwise; PRIVATELOAN is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if debt was raised via some private arrangement or credit facilities and is 0 otherwise; 
CONVERT.BOND is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond issue contains a convertibility option and is 0 
otherwise. Note that if a bond issue does not have a convertibility option, it is considered a straight bond or a 
plain vanilla bond. USE OF FUNDS is another issue-specific dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the debt 
was used for growth and is 0 for capital restructuring; 1-OFF ISSUE is a dummy variable which aims to control 
for the presumably lower market reactions to debt issued under a predetermined and preannounced program 
(where the dummy variable takes a value of 0) in contrast to those issued as 'one-off' events (where the dummy 
variable takes a value of 1). 
Let us now turn our attention to the firm-specific control variables. %OFTA represents, as an additional 
size-effect control, the fraction of the debt value to total assets; OPER.PROFIT aims to control for operating firm 
profitability; MTBV is the equity market-to-book value of the underlying firm; LTDTOTA is long-term debt to 
total assets; LOGAGE measures, in log terms, the years that the company has been in existence; finally, to control 
for anticipated reactions to high price run-ups (Masulis and Korwar, 1986) we use RUNUP for the 90 days (T-
100, T-11) cumulative share price returns. This RUNUP variable controls for the possibility that prices appreciate 
prior to the announcement date, T0, whereby such appreciations stem from factors irrelevant to the 
announcement itself. It is by now well-known among practitioners and academics that firm insiders may delay 
corporate decisions or announcements which they know will likely be ill-received by the market. Instead, they 
may 'time' such events during periods when their company's stock price has steadily risen (Myers and Majluf, 
1984).  
13 
 
In addition to the issue-specific and firm-specific variables, we also employ two market-related variables. 
30DMKTVOL is the realized 30-day volatility of the FTSE 100 index to represent aggregate market volatility; 
TSPREADS% is the spread between the 1-month and 30-year gilts and represents the yield curve in the United 
Kingdom. Integrating all the aforementioned recession and control variables, our extended cross-sectional 
model is as follows: 
CAR(T-1,T0) = α1 + β1LOGDEBT + β2EURO + β3PRIVATELOAN + β4CONVERT.BOND +     
 β5USE OF FUNDS + β61-OFFISSUE + β7%OFTA + β8OPER.PROFIT + β9MTBV +    
 β10LTDTOTA + β11LOGAGE + β12RUNUP + β1330DMKTVOL + β14TSPREADS% +    
 β15RECESS + β16UKESI(%) +  εt                                       (6) 
It is important to note that variations in UKESI seem to correspond with general sentiment in the aftermath of 
the Lehman Brothers crash. Specifically, and as is graphically shown in figure 1, sentiment begins to decline 
steadily after August 9, 2007 -  the time when Lehman shut down BNC Mortgage, its subprime lending unit. 
Events transpiring thereafter went from bad to worse as the investment banking community at large fretted 
over the possibility of a prolonged global recession that would stifle economic growth and entrepreneurship. 
Finally, and to complete the discussion of this subsection, model (6) is estimated using ordinary least squares 
with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White, 1980). 
 
3.4. Estimation of time-varying betas, alphas and Treynor ratios 
It is well-established by now in asset pricing that volatility is time-varying in nature and responds 
asymmetrically to positive and negative shocks in market returns. GARCH-type models have proved to be very 
successful in capturing many 'stylized facts' observed in the time-series properties of stock returns such as 
volatility persistence and clustering and have thus become the de facto standard for estimating volatility. 
 In the last few years we have thus seen a surge in the development of various GARCH-type models 
given their success in modelling the time series volatility dynamics of asset returns. As Cuthbertson and Nitzshe 
(2004, p.664) jokingly maintain, there exist more variations of the GARCH process 'than there are varieties of 
breakfast cereals...' 
 Given that market downswings ('bad' news) leads to more volatility than upswings ('good' news) of 
equal magnitude, the traditional GARCH model has been extended to accommodate such asymmetry in 
volatility caused by stock price behavior. 
 Such GARCH variants have been examined and assessed extensively; among many others, Pagan and 
Schwert (1990) evaluate several volatility models and conclude that the exponential GARCH (EGARCH) of 
Nelson (1991) provides the best overall 'fit' for return volatility. Likewise, Engle and Ng (1993) conclude the 
EGARCH does very well in capturing asymmetries in stock return volatility. 
 Given the aforementioned evidence, we model time-varying betas using a bivariate EGARCH that can 
be described as follows; 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
     𝑅𝑚,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚,𝑡              (7) 
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whereby 𝑅𝑖  denotes the returns of the individual stock and 𝑅𝑚 denotes the returns of the aggregate market 
portfolio. The time-varying beta estimate is represented by 𝛽𝑖  for the individual stock and shifts across time in 
accordance with news regarding the underlying firm i and market sentiment. Finally, the constants are denoted 
as 𝜔𝑖  and 𝜔𝑚  and the innovations, or error terms, are 𝜀𝑖  and 𝜀𝑚  for the individual stock and the market, 
respectively. 
 Elements of the variance and covariance matrix for the two error terms can be described using a 
bivariate EGARCH; 
𝜎2[𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = exp (𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝑎𝑖,1(|𝑧𝑖,𝑡−1| − 𝐸|𝑧𝑖,𝑡−1| + 𝛾𝑖𝑧𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜃𝑖ln(𝜎
2[ε𝑖,𝑡−1])) 
  𝜎2[𝜀𝑚,𝑡] = exp (𝛼𝑚,0 + 𝑎𝑚,1(|𝑧𝑚,𝑡−1| − 𝐸|𝑧𝑚,𝑡−1| + 𝛾𝑚𝑧𝑚,𝑡−1) + 𝜃𝑚ln(𝜎
2[ε𝑚,𝑡−1])) 
  𝜎𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖,𝑚(𝜎
2[𝜀𝑖,𝑡]𝜎
2[𝜀𝑚,𝑡])
1/2
            (8) 
where the normalized innovations for each individual stock, 𝑧𝑖 , and the market portfolio, 𝑧𝑚, can be expressed 
as follows for each sampled day 𝑡: 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 𝜎[𝜀𝑖,𝑡]⁄  and  𝑧𝑚,𝑡 = 𝜀𝑚,𝑡 𝜎[𝜀𝑚,𝑡]⁄ . The conditional covariance as well 
as the conditional correlation coefficient are denoted by 𝜎𝑖,𝑚,𝑡  and 𝜌𝑖,𝑚 , respectively. The remainder of the 
bivariate EGARCH parameters are fixed and to be estimated; 𝛼𝑖,0, 𝛼𝑚,0, 𝑎𝑖,1, 𝑎𝑚,1, 𝛾𝑖 , 𝛾𝑚, 𝜃𝑖  and 𝜃𝑚, respectively. 
Volatility persistence is captured by the parameters 𝜃𝑖  and 𝜃𝑚, respectively. 
 The bivariate EGARCH specification in (8) is advantageous in at least two respects. First, the 
conditional variance, 𝜎2, responds asymmetrically to 'good' and 'bad' news. This asymmetry is captured by 𝛾𝑖  
and 𝛾𝑚 for the conditional variance of the individual stock and the market portfolio, respectively. Specifically, 
a negative sign for these coefficients implies that 'bad' news (negative return innovations) leads to more 
volatility than 'good' news (positive return innovations) of equal magnitude. Second, unlike traditional GARCH-
type models, the log-linear nature of the EGARCH specification precludes the possibility of estimating a 
negative conditional variance for any given sampled time period and thus does not require that we impose non-
negativity constraints. 
 Time-varying betas, 𝛽𝑖 , can be extracted from (7) and (8) for each individual sampled stock; 
     𝛽𝑖,𝑡 = (𝜎𝑖,𝑚,𝑡) (𝜎
2[𝜀𝑚,𝑡])⁄      (9) 
and, since the conditional covariance, 𝜎𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 , as well as conditional variance of returns for the market portfolio, 
𝜎2[𝜀𝑚,𝑡], are time-varying, beta is also time-varying and evolves in accordance with corporate events, shifts in 
investment opportunities, market sentiment and, finally, perceived prospects associated with the underlying 
stock 𝑖. 
 Estimating time-varying betas in (9) is advantageous in that it permits the survey of a stock's beta risk 
over finer time granularities relative to betas deduced from 'static' asset pricing models such as the single-
period CAPM. Thus, by examining a stock's beta risk day-to-day one can, for example, decipher the impact of 
certain events confined within a particular day while the impact of such an event would otherwise be distorted 
when using the single-period CAPM to produce point estimates of beta. This is because point estimates of betas, 
even in a rolling regression framework, depend on observations before and after an event of interest - 
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observations which may otherwise be irrelevant and not representative of the nature of the event we wish to 
capture. 
 When estimating parameters for the bivariate EGARCH in (8), we assume the error term is drawn from 
a normal density distribution (Hentschel, 1995) and by maximizing the likelihood function over the sampling 
periods which can be expressed as follows; 
   𝐿(𝛩) = −(𝑇 2⁄ )log(2𝜋) − (1 2⁄ ) ∑ (log|𝐻𝑡| + 𝐸𝑡𝐻
−1𝐸′)𝑇𝑡=1         (10) 
where 𝑇 denotes the number of observations, 𝛩 is the vector parameter to be estimated, 𝐸𝑡 = [𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜀𝑚,𝑡] is the 
vector of innovations at sample time 𝑡 and 𝐻𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑡−1(𝐸𝑡). Given that nonlinearities exist in the log likelihood 
function, we employ numerical maximization techniques to obtain sample parameter estimates using the 
algorithm based on Berndt et al. (1974). 
 Although it serves many useful purposes to try and deduce how announcing firms' time-varying betas 
change before and after announcements, a more complete picture can be achieved by specifically looking at 
time-varying risk-adjusted returns. Whereas solely examining time-varying betas using (9) can lead to 
inferences regarding how announcing firms' systematic risks shift, it is silent on how returns behave or 
whether shareholders are compensated for commensurate shifts in such risk. 
 Thus, in addition to time-varying betas, we also extract 'time-varying alphas,' i, for each firm which 
signify the 'portion' of return over and above what is predicted by the time-varying beta in (9) when each firm's 
realized returns are regressed against these time-varying betas. Keeping the same notation that is used in 
describing equations (7) and (9), we can express i as follows; 
      𝑎𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡          (11) 
In addition to time-varying alphas, we construct 'time-varying Treynor ratios' as another means to gauge firms' 
excess returns per unit of market risk; 
      𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑦𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑅𝑓,𝑡
𝛽𝑖,𝑡
         (12) 
 Given that our measures for time-varying alphas and Treynor ratios, respectively, express risk-
adjusted returns, it is expected that both will yield qualitatively identical results.  
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
4.1. The determinants of abnormal returns 
Table 2 provides the mean AR and preliminary univariate tests of means for our sample, addressing our 
question on how the market reacts to a debt issue announcement. Panel A documents the AAR and ASAR for 
the various time windows, while Panel B reports the average ACAR and ACSAR for three event windows around 
T0, namely (T-1,T+1), (T-1,T0) and (T0,T+1). These time windows signify average cumulative abnormal returns 
one trading day before and after the debt issue announcement day, T0. This tight window represents a time 
when traders with an eye for news may move prices in one direction or another and (re)position themselves 
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in order to reap potentially 'quick' profits. Thus, these announcements signal an important shift in the debt 
structure of firms and have the capacity to change the risk and return characteristics of announcing firms' 
common stock. It is also the time when we would naturally expect to see a general (market) reaction given that 
debt issue announcements carry implications for how the underlying company will restructure its debt.  
All parametric and non-parametric tests in table 2 support the notion that debt issue announcements are 
linked with negative market reactions. Such negative AR are somewhat evident during the pre-announcement 
period (T-3, T0) and are especially pronounced on the day of the announcement, T0; the AAR computed from all 
sampled firms on this day is -0.26%. Likewise, the ACAR on the announcement day T0 is -0.35%. These negative 
AAR for the UK market echo findings of studies examining the implications of debt announcements in other 
countries (e.g., Amman and Seiz (2006) for Switzerland and Germany). 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
As one of our principal objectives is to examine the role of the recession on the market's reactions to debt 
issue announcements, table 3 reports the market reaction results from univariate tests of means and mean 
differences in ACARs after splitting the sample by the dummy variable RECESS, with the cut-off point being 
August 9, 2007 (in Panel A). In addition, and as a robustness procedure, we entertain the possibility that 
broader market sentiment plays a role in terms of the reaction to debt issue announcements. Thus, in Panel B, 
we split the sample on the basis of the level of the UK Economic Sentiment Indicator (UKESI) during the period 
surrounding the announcement day whereby UKESI>100 denotes above average sentiment levels while 
UKESI<100 indicates below average sentiment levels. 
The recessionary sample documents significantly lower AR compared to those of non-recessionary. All 
two-day mean differences in AR are negative, ranging from -0.08% to -0.57% for the first set of comparisons in 
Panel A and from -0.47% to -0.76% for the second set in Panel B. Even more interesting is the fact that ACARs 
in the non-recession samples (RECESS = 0 and/or UKESI > 100) are very close to zero and statistically non-
significant, while within the recessionary samples (RECESS = 1 and/or UKESI < 100), all two day ACARs are 
negative and statistically significant at least at the 5% level (except during (T0, T+1) based on RECESS = 1 (Panel 
A) where there is no statistical significance). This suggests that the surrounding economic sentiment may act 
as a predictor of average AR surrounding debt issue announcements. In positive sentiment periods, debt issue 
announcements appear to go unnoticed while in periods of contraction and decline, debt issue announcements 
are accompanied by negative and statistically significant excess returns. 
These preliminary findings shed light onto how recessionary periods exacerbate outside investors' 
sensitivity to information asymmetry. Specifically, during periods of low sentiment, investors become possibly 
more loss averse and question the quality and intents of firms' management when announcing new debt issues. 
This may lead to some investors exiting their positions and instead opting to wait to see the true intentions of 
management and their abilities to implement positive NPV projects. This applies downward pressure on prices 
and thus we see the negative ACARs which we report. Management's timing of debt issue announcements is 
thus important because this will directly impact their stock's price; in times of economic upheaval, there may 
17 
 
be a sharper than usual downward reaction in their company's stock price if they choose to announce the 
issuance of debt securities. 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
To examine whether the qualitative nature of the above conclusions hold in the presence of firm-specific, 
issue-specific and market-wide controls, we employ the cross-sectional model described in (6). In Panel A of 
table 4 we present the correlation matrix of all the variables employed in the analysis and in panel B we display 
key summary statistics. 
[Insert table 4 about here] 
In table 5, we report the results from six consecutive OLS regression models. The first four models (models 
1 through 4) report each 'class' of control variables namely, issue-specific (model 1), firm-specific (model 2) 
and market-related (models 3 and 4) variables, respectively. The latter set also investigate our research 
question on whether investor sentiment affect the market reactions around debt issue announcements. Models 
5 and 6 are referred to as 'full' models because they report our economic conditions variables as well as all 
control variables. These models test the explanatory power of the issue-specific, firm-specific and market-
related factors when they are included together and they collectively exert an influence on CARs. 
When we we test the effect of all issue-level variables in model 1, we find that CARs react negatively when 
debt is issued in Euros, but positively when they are a 'one-off' issue. In other words, the market reacts 
negatively if the debt is not in British pounds but in Euros, and it reacts positively to the debt issue if the 
company does not frequently issue debt (and therefore does not intend to issue debt again in the near future). 
In model 2, none of the firm-level controls is flagged as significant and the model has essentially no explanatory 
power. In both models 3 and 4, which test market-level variables, the coefficient for the share price run-up is 
negative and significant suggesting that share prices react more negatively for high pre-announcement run-
ups, as is expected. This shows that investors are able to recognize when the debt issue is timed around a 
company’s upward price trend and react negatively.   
The two main explanatory variables, RECESS (from model 5) and UKESI (from model 6), which proxy for 
economic sentiment are also flagged as significant and bear the expected signs. The coefficient of the dummy 
variable RECESS is negative (-0.007, p-value<0.05) and suggests that in the recession period share price 
reactions to debt issue announcements in the LSE exhibit, ceteris paribus, negative abnormal returns. 
Consistent with the above, the coefficient for UKESI is positive and significant, meaning that across the entire 
sample, the higher (lower) the economic sentiment the higher (lower) the two-day abnormal returns will be 
around the event announcement. 
As indicated by the full model estimations (models 5 and 6) the above results are robust to the inclusion 
of all control variables. The value of the adjusted R2 and the F values across the models are somewhat consistent 
with empirical literature that seeks to explain cumulative abnormal returns following some event of interest 
(Madura and Akhigbe, 1995). 
[Insert table 5 about here] 
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4.2. 'Single-period' betas and alphas 
Contemporary asset pricing supports the notion that risks and returns vary dynamically across time and this 
serves as a motivation for many of the advances in intertemporal asset pricing. For a multitude of reasons 
however, academics and practitioners refer to betas and alphas extracted from the single-period CAPM or 
market model in order to draw inferences. To maintain tradition, and before proceeding to examine the time-
varying dynamics of issuing firms' risk and return characteristics following debt announcements, let us 
consider what can be deduced by scrutinizing our sampled firms' 'static' betas and alphas that are implied by 
a single-period CAPM. 
The findings from the CARs in section 3.2 and table 2 suggest debt issue announcements are generally 
associated with negative short-term market reactions. As table 3 reports, such negative short-term reactions 
appear more pronounced during our sampled recession period. Given the longer term implications associated 
with debt issue announcements, it is of interest to see, firstly, whether we can detect shifts in such 'single-
period' betas and alphas across relatively longer time horizons.  
Consistent with the method used by Grullon et al. (2002) and Charitou et al. (2011) for measuring shifts 
in CAPM-derived betas and alphas across time windows, we estimate the following regression: 
  𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑎∆𝑖𝐷𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝑏∆𝑖𝐷(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡)𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡        (13) 
where D is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for t ≥ T0 and 0 otherwise, whereby T0 denotes the day of 
the debt issue announcement; 𝑟𝑖𝑡  is the daily return of stock i; 𝑟𝑓𝑡  is the daily return of the 1-month UK treasury 
bill; 𝑟𝑚𝑡  is the daily return on the FTSE 100 market index.  
For our full sample and then our non-recessionary and recessionary samples, we estimate (13) for the 
200 days surrounding the announcement day, T0. The coefficients of principal interest are 𝑎 and 𝑏. In this case, 
𝑎 (alpha) denotes firm i's risk-adjusted (or abnormal) returns while 𝑏 (beta) signifies firm i's systematic risk. 
However, (13) makes a distinction between estimated alphas and betas preceding and following the 
announcement date, T0. Specifically, while 𝑎𝑖  represents alpha prior to T0, 𝑎∆𝑖  is the change in the underlying 
firm's alpha following T0. Similarly, while 𝑏𝑖  represents beta prior to T0, 𝑏∆𝑖  is the change in the underlying 
firm's beta following T0. 
Cross-sectional mean and median values for alphas and betas (and their changes), in (13) are all reported 
in table 6 for the full, non-recessionary and recessionary sample periods. The final column reports the 
differences between the non-recessionary and recessionary sub-sample coefficients. The significance levels of 
the means are based on two-tailed T-tests while those of the medians are based on two-tailed Wilcoxon rank 
tests.  
The results of the full sample suggest that debt issue announcements are in general accompanied by 
negative risk-adjusted returns. The coefficient 𝑎∆𝑖  is approximately -0.0002 or -0.02% while before T0, the 
coefficient denoting risk-adjusted returns (𝑎𝑖) was 0.0003 or 0.03%. The 𝑎∆𝑖  and 𝑎 for the non-recessionary 
and recessionary sub-samples are similar to the full sample. Nevertheless, the differences in means, albeit 
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statistically significant at the 10% level for 𝑎∆𝑖 , suggest that risk-adjusted returns are lower when debt issue 
announcements take place during recessionary period. 
[Insert table 6 about here] 
Regarding the underlying firms' beta risks, they tend to generally rise following the announcement of a 
debt issue, irrespective of the increase in risk adjusted return. For the full sample, the coefficient 𝑏∆𝑖  is 0.007 
(mean) and 0.005 (median). While for the non-recessionary sub-sample period the coefficient 𝑏∆𝑖  drops 
slightly, for the recessionary sample it rises by 0.018 (mean) and 0.026 (median). The differences in the mean 
and median between the two sub-samples, are statistically significant at the 5% level. This provides some 
evidence that betas tend to rise in general following debt issue announcements (as can be seen in the full 
sample). However, such rises are more pronounced following announcements that take place during 
recessionary periods.  
Once we combine the findings on alphas with those on betas, we deduce the following: There appears to be an 
overall positive risk-return tradeoff (considering the alphas 𝛼𝑖  and betas 𝑏𝑖 ) in our full sample, which is 
consistent with the theoretical predictions. However, this relationship reverses and becomes negative 
following debt announcements (considering the change coefficients, where 𝑎∆𝑖  is positive but 𝑏∆𝑖 is negative, 
albeit not statistically significant). In other words, betas rise in the overall sample even when we observe a fall 
in risk-adjusted returns. Interestingly, when observing the risk-return relationship of the two sub-samples we 
can deduce the following: there appears to be a positive risk-return tradeoff following announcements in our 
full sample. In other words, although betas rise in the overall sample we also observe a rise in risk-adjusted 
returns. However, in the recessionary sample, betas tend to rise relatively more yet risk-adjusted returns drop. 
This is evidence of perhaps a negative risk-return tradeoff. 
This evidence serves as a caution for inside corporate managers seeking to make debt issue 
announcements. It appears that the 'signalling' of debt may result in either a positive or negative risk-return 
tradeoff depending on the general economic climate. If the economic climate is generally negative, shareholders 
may experience a rise in beta risk and a simultaneous decline in risk-adjusted returns. Importantly, the findings 
from (13) also indicate that betas and returns are time-varying in nature. Although asset pricing literature 
generally supports the notion that risks and returns are time-dependent, event study literature in corporate 
finance has traditionally relied on single-period CAPM-type specifications to try and draw inferences. We 
therefore proceed in the next sub-section, by addressing the above empirical gap. 
 
4.3. Time-varying betas, alphas and Treynor ratios 
We expound on the notion that risks and returns are in fact time-varying. We therefore estimate our sampled 
firms' time-varying betas, alphas and, ultimately, Treynor ratios in an effort to ascertain the impact of a debt 
issue in the days surrounding the announcement date, T0 for our full, non-recessionary and recessionary 
sample periods. We use time-varying betas as estimated in (9) using the bivariate EGARCH expressed in (7) 
and (8), which provide the opportunity to examine firms' risk on a day-to-day basis in the time period 
surrounding the announcement date. In order to make conclusions regarding the impact of debt issue 
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announcements on stocks' beta risk, we estimate (9) for each stock in our sample from T-99 until T+99. We then 
average all the individual betas from each stock i in order to produce a plot of these 'aggregated' betas to get 
an understanding of what happens, on average, when a firm announces a debt issue. 
This plot can be seen in Figure 2. Panel A contains the aggregate betas for the entire sample while panels 
B and C contain aggregate betas for the non-recessionary and recessionary sample periods, respectively. Visual 
inspection of the figures suggests that after the announcement date, T0, beta risk has a tendency to rise, on 
average, and remain at elevated levels even a month afterwards for the full sample period. Of course, and as is 
a recurring theme throughout this paper, betas seem to rise more markedly during the recessionary sample 
period (panel C). 
[Insert figure 2 about here] 
Summary statistics in Panel A of Table 7 (for the entire sample consisting of 194 individual firms) also 
provides a story that corroborates what we see visually from Panel A of Figure 2. Specifically, there is a rise in 
time-varying betas immediately following the announcement. For the full sample of firms, beta rises by an 
average of approximately 10% in the immediate days following the announcement (T0, T+5). In the T+6,T+30 
window following the announcement, beta rises by an average of approximately 14% and, in the T+30,T+99 day 
window, it is higher by an average of approximately 23% when compared to its level immediately before the 
announcement (T-50,T-1).  
Regarding the non-recessionary (recessionary) sub-samples, beta rises by approximately 10% (11%), by 
10% (19%) and by 17% (37%) during the three time windows post-announcement, respectively. More 
specifically, if we focus on announcements made during the non-recessionary period, betas rise on average by 
approximately 10% during the days following the announcement from 0.9291 during the (T-50, T-1) window to 
1.0269 during the (T0, T+5) window. Afterwards, beta remains relatively flat and only rises to an average of 
approximately 1.0858 during the (T+31, T+99) window. For the recessionary period, rises in beta are more 
pronounced. Within the 5 days immediately following the announcement, (T0, T+5), firms' betas rise on average 
by approximately 11%, from 1.129 to 1.256. In the (T+6, T+30) window they rise to 1.3421, a 19% increase from 
the 1.1294 during (T-50, T-1) window. This is in sharp contrast to what was calculated in the (T+6, T+30) window 
for the full and non-recessionary samples, respectively. The rise in beta only becomes more intense during the 
(T+31, T+99) window when we see it rise by an average of approximately 37%.  
This asymmetric behavior in beta risk is consistent with the notion that an attempt to 'signal' markets via 
new debt issue announcements during bad economic times may result in exacerbated levels of systematic risk 
for their firm. It appears that as risk aversion levels increase during recessionary periods, the betas rise 
asymmetrically at extremely high levels.  
[Insert table 7 about here] 
This asymmetric behavior in beta is confirmed using an OLS regression approach with time dummies for 
each of the aforementioned time windows. Coefficients for these dummies as well as their statistical 
significance are reported in Table 8. In Panel A, we present the time dummies for firms' time-varying betas, 
while in panel B we show the time dummies for their time-varying alphas, as expressed in (11). These alphas 
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(which represent risk-adjusted returns) are unique in the sense that they are estimated from time-varying 
betas. Figure 3 is a time series plot of the cumulative time-varying alphas across the full and the two period 
sub-samples. 
[Insert table 8 about here]  
[Insert figure 3 about here] 
Finally, and complementary to the time-varying alphas, we construct time-varying Treynor ratios using 
(12). As betas are time-varying, this Treynor ratio evolves daily as well. Similar to the alpha, Treynor ratios 
measure excess returns per unit of market risk. Put another way, it is a risk-adjusted measure of excess returns 
and, similarly to alpha, a portfolio management metric that measures excess reward when accounting for 
additional risk (variability). Table 9 contains time dummy regression estimates for the Treynor ratios for each 
respective time window for the full sample, non-recessionary and recessionary sample periods, respectively. 
Finally, figure 4 is a time series plot of time-varying Treynor ratios for each of the sampling periods. 
 [Insert table 9 about here] 
[Insert figure 4 about here] 
When examining the time-varying risk-return dynamics of the full sample, the following conclusions 
emerge. Firstly, there appears to be a discernible rise in beta risk following the announcement of debt. The 
announcement date, T0, serves as a prelude to the capital structure changes that will ensue and thus serve as a 
'signal' for shareholders that the underlying firm will 'leverage up' relative to the value of its equity. Although 
this conclusion can be drawn by visual inspection of panel A of Figure 2 and by observing the means of betas 
across various time windows following T0 in Table 7, statistical analysis in Table 8 appears to corroborate this 
view. In Panel A of Table 8, we document that dummy variables for time-varying betas for both time windows 
(Τ6, Τ30) and (Τ31, Τ99) are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level at least. This supports the view 
that in about one trading week following T0, beta risk for the announcing firm begins to rise steadily. 
If we now turn our attention to how risk-adjusted returns behave following T0, we will be in a better 
position to answer whether shareholders are rewarded for the rises in beta risk. If we visually inspect Figures 
3 and 4 which show time series plots of time-varying alphas and time-varying Treynor ratios, we can ascertain 
that there is a general trend upwards in risk-adjusted returns following T0 for the full sample. In line with this, 
statistical analysis reported in Panel B of Table 8 corroborates this view. There is statistical significance at the 
1% level for time-varying alpha dummies in all windows following T0. In fact, in the time window (Τ-50,Τ-1) there 
is evidence that time-varying alphas begin to rise even prior to T0. There is no readily available explanation to 
this other than it may constitute an expectation of an announcement by insiders and whereby such information 
may begin to leak to the public. Table 9 shows qualitatively identical conclusions. These findings thus so far, 
for the full sample, offer an affirmative answer to the abovementioned question of whether beta risk is 
rewarded. 
Naturally, the next step in our analysis is to examine whether the recent great recession of 2007-2008 
played a role in terms of how beta risk responded to debt issue announcements. Consistent with classical 
corporate finance theory we expect investors' discount rate to be linked with their opportunity cost of capital 
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and their degree of loss aversion. It is therefore reasonable to expect that in times of economic turbulence 
(when information asymmetries and divergences of opinion regarding what the future holds are most 
pronounced) investors' opportunity costs may naturally rise along with their required rate of return. During 
such times of overall low economic sentiment, the conflicts of interest between bondholders and stockholders 
may reach exacerbated levels and bondholders will be particularly sensitive to risky projects which 
stockholders are keen to undertake in hopes of achieving high returns. 
Indeed, after dividing our sample between non-recession and recession periods in Figure 2 we observe a 
certain level of asymmetry across beta reactions. Specifically, debt-announcing firms in the recessionary period 
experience a discernibly sharper rise in their beta risk to those in the non-recessionary sample. In line with this 
are the univariate findings in Table 7 and the time dummy regression results in Table 8, which also corroborate 
this asymmetric behavior in betas. Panel A of Table 8 shows that in the time windows (Τ6, Τ30) and (Τ31, Τ99), 
respectively, betas for the recessionary sub-sample are higher than those on the non-recessionary sub-sample. 
For the sake of comparison, the last column of Panel A shows the differences between the non-recessionary 
and recessionary sub-samples. The differences for the time windows (Τ6, Τ30) and (Τ31, Τ99), respectively, are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus far, such an observed asymmetry in the behavior of 
beta is consistent with the notion that the economic climate leads to relatively sharper rises in beta risk. 
Having ascertained the asymmetric behavior of beta risk following T0 in non-recessionary versus the 
recessionary sample period, let us consider, as was posed in the question earlier, whether such risk is in fact 
rewarded. For the non-recessionary sample, there appears to be in Figure 3 (Panel B) a reward for the modest 
rises in beta risk. This is confirmed also statistically in Panel B of Table 8 (time-varying alphas) and Table 9 
(time-varying Treynor ratios). Specifically, we detect positive and statistically significant values for time-
varying alpha dummy variables that capture all time windows following T0. In Table 9 we again ascertain 
qualitatively similar conclusions. 
However, for the recessionary sample in Figure 3 (Panel C), although there are positive time-varying 
alphas for the time windows (Τ0, Τ5) and (Τ6, Τ30), they are noticeably lower than the respective windows for 
the non-recessionary sample. This is an indication that risk-adjusted returns are lower despite the higher beta 
risk associated with the recession. In addition, for the time window (Τ31, Τ99), mean alphas turn negative and 
are statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that after about two trading months, a negative risk-
return trade-off manifests for shareholders. In other words, although beta risk rises, this is coupled with 
negative returns. The time-varying Treynor ratios in Figure 4 and Table 9 provide qualitatively identical 
conclusions.  
When we statistically test for differences in risk-adjusted returns between the non-recessionary and 
recessionary samples (the last column of Panel B in Table 8 and the last column in Table 9) we find that indeed 
risk-adjusted returns drop across all time windows following Τ0. These differences in samples are all significant 
at least at the 5% level and show that the positive risk-return tradeoff in the non-recessionary sample is 
actually inversed in the recessionary sample. 
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5. SUMMARY & CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Debt issue announcements serve as a source of information for outside investors regarding the future earnings 
potential of an underlying firm. Since the Modigliani-Miller theorem on the irrelevancy of capital structure, 
there has been no agreement as to whether debt announcements are positively or negatively received by the 
market. Put another way, do they lead to rises or declines in shareholder wealth? Extant literature has produced 
mixed findings and cannot provide a conclusive answer to this question. 
On the one hand, corporate finance theory posits that, consistent with the notion of market efficiency and 
that all market participants possess equal access to all relevant information, there should not be a sharp 
reaction to corporate disclosures such as debt announcements. In addition, the irrelevancy proposition argues 
that in perfect markets, it is of no consequence what capital structure a firm utilizes to fund its operations. Ross 
(1977) presents a signalling model whereby rises in leverage ought to be linked with a perception that the firm 
will rise in value. Since information asymmetry is an omnipresent force in the market, outside investors are 
tasked with the difficult responsibility of trying to 'decode' the true meaning of managerial disclosures. Ross 
(1977) argues that debt announcements do serve as a signal of value and that the underlying firm is committed 
to pursuing positive NPV projects. The empirical literature that follows Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Ross 
(1977) is mixed in terms of explaining how debt announcement signals have been received by the market.  
We show that outside investors respond to debt announcement signals differently depending on 
aggregate economic conditions and sentiment. In an innovation relative to extant event study literature, we 
estimate time-varying betas, alphas and Treynor ratios to examine the risk-return tradeoff of announcing firms' 
common stock following debt announcements. We uncover the following regarding the market's reaction to 
debt announcements. Firstly, betas of announcing firms usually rise in varying degrees across time windows 
following the announcement of a new debt issue. Such rises are ostensibly more pronounced for firms that 
choose to make a debt announcement during recessionary times. Secondly, after estimating time-varying 
alphas and Treynor ratios, we find evidence of a positive risk-return tradeoff in the common stock of 
announcing firms that chose to make a debt announcement during normal economic conditions. Conversely, 
the risk-return tradeoff is negative for firms that make a debt announcement during recessionary periods when 
investor sentiment is low on aggregate. 
The intuition behind these findings is as follows. Both in good and bad economic times, there is some 
degree of information asymmetry between inside managers and outside investors. During bad times, however, 
outside investors become more sensitized to this information asymmetry and more loss averse in response to 
the rising probability of losses on their portfolios. They have more of an inclination to question the quality and 
intent of an inside manager's decisions and announcement disclosures. An otherwise benign corporate 
announcement during a booming phase in the economy instead prompts questions and suspicions among 
investors. In the words of Akerlof (1970), they ask themselves whether the underlying firm is selling peaches 
or lemons? In other words, do corporate managers really have positive NPV projects to invest in? Or, will this 
new debt issue only raise the underlying firm's distress costs? 
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In addition to their theoretical importance, our findings also carry cautionary messages for corporate 
managers. Specifically, if inside managers of a firm do have positive NPV projects to invest in and wish to signal 
this to outside investors, they need to be aware of the fact that the market can respond very differently to debt 
announcements based on aggregate market conditions. In other words, timing is everything from a managerial 
point of view. If inside managers choose to ignore this finding they may be sacrificing shareholder wealth along 
with possibly their own wealth (especially if their performance and compensation are a function of their firm's 
stock price performance). An otherwise positive signal can be interpreted negatively by the market if it is made 
at the wrong time. 
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FIGURES & TABLES 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1   Time-series plot of the FTSE 100 market price, economic sentiment and debt announcements 
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Figure 2:  Mean time-varying betas around debt announcements 
Panel A: Entire sample (N = 194) 
 
Panel B: Non-recessionary sub-sample (N = 109) 
 
Panel C: Recessionary sub-sample (N = 85) 
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Figure 3:  Mean cumulative time-varying alphas around debt announcements 
Panel A: Entire sample (N = 194) 
 
Panel B: Non-recessionary sub-sample (N = 109) 
 
Panel C: Recessionary sub-sample (N = 85) 
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Figure 4:  Time-varying Treynor ratios around debt announcements 
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Table 1   Frequency of debt issues in the total sample (N=194) 
Year Number of events Debt value (£ mil) % 
2003 27         12,500.0  7.97% 
2004 19         11,500.0  7.33% 
2005 20           9,420.0  6.00% 
2006 28         15,200.0  9.69% 
2007 25         14,100.0  8.99% 
2008 29         58,700.0  37.41% 
2009 29         18,400.0  11.73% 
2010 17         17,100.0  10.90% 
Total 194    156,920.0  100% 
Notes: This table reports the number of debt announcements for each fiscal year as well as 
their debt value (in millions of £). There are a total of 194 debt announcements whereby 
the largest percentage of such announcements took place in FY2008. 
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Table 2   Average abnormal returns and average cumulative abnormal returns 
Panel A: Average abnormal returns (AAR) 
Event day          AAR   ASAR Sign test (+)/(-) 
T-5 0.05%  0.07  103/85  
  (0.501)   [0.747]   [0.135]  
T-4 0.08%  0.05  100/86  
  (0.62)   [0.473]   [-0.292]  
T-3 -0.22% ** -0.21 ** 84/105 *** 
  (-1.924)   [-1.948]   [-2.567]  
T-2 0.05%  0.00  102/86  
  (0.474)   [0.010]   [-0.007]  
T-1 -0.09%  -0.15 ** 87/102 ** 
  (-0.888)   [-1.673]   [-2.140]  
T0 -0.26% *** -0.26 *** 93/97 * 
  (-2.352)   [-2.446]   [-1.287]  
T+1 0.07%  0.06  102/82  
  (0.764)   [0.761]   [-0.007]  
T+2 -0.01%  0.00  92/92 * 
  (-0.137)   [-0.018]   [-1.429]  
T+3 0.07%  0.04  101/83  
  (0.664)   [0.430]   [-0.150]  
T+4 0.00%  0.04  95/97  
  (0.009)   [0.461]   [-1.003]  
T+5 0.00%  -0.01  107/82  
 (0.037)  [-0.100]  [0.704]  
Panel B: Average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) 
Event window     ACAR    ACSAR Sign test (+)/(-) 
T-1, T+1 -0.28% ** -0.31 *** 98/96 
 
  (-1.800)   [-2.368]   [-0.576]  
T-1, T0 -0.35% *** -0.37 *** 87/107 ** 
  (-2.468)   [-2.912]   [-2.140]  
T0, T+1 -0.19%  -0.17 * 94/100  
  (-1.394)   [-1.422]  [-1.145]  
Notes: This table presents the average abnormal returns (AAR) and average standardized abnormal 
returns (ASAR) for the various event windows in panel A. In panel B we report the average cumulative 
abnormal returns (ACAR) and average cumulative standardized abnormal returns (ACSAR) for the 
respective event windows which reflect the immediate one-day reaction following the announcement 
date. The third column reports the sign test for panels A and B, respectively, and describes the 
distribution of positive (+) versus negative (-) returns as well as the z-statistic (McConnell and 
Muscarella, 1985). 
The two-tail t-test results are presented in parentheses (.) and the Patell standardized residual (PSR) 
test results and sign test z-scores in brackets [.]. 
 
*,**,*** denote significance at the 90.0%, 95.0% and 99.0% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3   Average cumulative abnormal returns by economic conditions 
Panel A: ACAR by economic condition 
Event window RECESS=0 (N=109) RECESS=1 (N=85)     Difference 
T-1, T+1 -0.07%  -0.56% ** -0.49%  
  (-0.389)   (-1.975)   [-1.483]   
T-1, T0 -0.10%  -0.67% *** -0.57% * 
  (-0.649)   (-2.624)   [-1.892]   
T0, T+1 -0.16%  -0.24%  -0.08%  
  (-1.131)   (-0.932)   [-0.029]   
Panel B: ACAR by UK economic sentiment indicator 
Event Window UKESI >100 (N=106) UKESI <100 (N=88)     Difference 
T-1, T+1 0.01%  -0.63% ** -0.64% ** 
  (0.058)   (-2.370)   [-1.997]   
T-1, T0 -0.01%  -0.76% *** -0.76% *** 
  (-0.037)   (-3.055)   [-2.587]   
T0, T+1 0.02%  -0.45% ** -0.47% * 
  (0.096)   (-1.978)   [-1.652]   
Notes: In panel A of this table we present the average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) for three event windows 
surrounding the debt announcement date; the first column is for the sample period prior to the height of the recession 
(from January 1, 2003 until August 9, 2007) while the second column is for the post-recessionary period (from August 9, 
2007 until December 31, 2010). In the third column we compute whether there is a statistically significant difference in 
ACAR between the first and second columns. Unlike in panel A, in panel B we divide the samples based on the level of the 
UK Economic Sentiment Indicator (UKESI). When this indicator is greater than 100 (UKESI>100) it indicates a greater 
possibility that market conditions are either positive or 'normal.' Conversely, when this indicator falls below 100 
(UKESI<100) it signals waning investor sentiment and possibly weak economic conditions. Finally, as in panel A, in the 
third column of panel B we compute whether there is a statistically significant difference in ACAR between the first and 
second columns.  
The two-tail t-test results are presented in parentheses (.) and the z-test results in brackets [.]. 
*,**,*** denote significance at the 90.0%, 95.0% and 99.0% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
Table 4   Descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis 
Panel A: Correlation matrix of the variables in the cross sectional models 
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 
1. CAR(-1,0) 1.00                  
2. LOGDEBT 0.04 1.00                 
3. EURO -0.13 0.05 1.00                
4. PRIVATE LOAN 0.06 0.20** -0.14 1.00               
5. STRAIGHT BOND 0.03 -0.15* 0.13 -0.83*** 1.00              
6. CONVERT. BOND -0.15* -0.05 -0.01 -0.09 -0.48*** 1.00             
7. USE OF FUNDS 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.08 -0.11 0.06 1.00            
8. 1-OFF ISSUE 0.04 -0.36*** 0.31*** -0.36*** 0.43*** -0.21** -0.17* 1.00           
9. % OF TA -0.02 0.31*** -0.11 0.33*** -0.31*** 0.02 0.04 -0.25*** 1.00          
10. OPER. PROFIT 0.00 -0.10 0.11 0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.07 0.10 -0.13 1.00         
11. MTBV -0.07 -0.05 0.16* -0.03 -0.14 0.29*** 0.19** -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 1.00        
12. LTDTOTA -0.03 -0.12 0.10 0.22** -0.15* -0.07 0.01 0.03 0.25*** 0.20** -0.14 1.00       
13. LOGAGE -0.04 0.22** -0.08 0.03 0.04 -0.11 0.03 -0.31*** -0.04 -0.14 -0.04 -0.21** 1.00      
14. RUNUP -0.21** -0.09 0.05 0.12 -0.20** 0.18* 0.09 -0.18* 0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.15* -0.07 1.00     
15.30D MKT VOL. -0.07 0.06 0.05 -0.09 0.16* -0.13 0.00 0.13 -0.15* 0.01 -0.05 -0.15* 0.20** -0.14 1.00    
16. TSPREADS% 0.15* -0.01 0.06 -0.12 0.12 -0.03 -0.01 0.09 -0.05 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.31*** 0.04 1.00   
17. RECESS -0.15* 0.17* -0.06 -0.02 0.11 -0.16* 0.03 0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.09 -0.25*** 0.32*** -0.16* 0.60*** -0.35*** 1.00  
18. UKESI (%) 0.17* -0.11 0.04 0.07 -0.10 0.06 0.14* -0.05 0.06 0.15* 0.06 0.16* -0.19** 0.03 -0.29*** 0.55*** -0.53*** 1.00 
Panel B: Summary statistics of the variables in the cross sectional models 
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 
Mean  -0.004 8.551 0.216 0.139 0.809 0.052 0.119 0.443 0.072 0.180 0.053 21.050 2.808 0.042 1.021 -0.004 0.438 0.990 
Std. Dev. 0.020 0.521 0.413 0.347 0.394 0.222 0.324 0.498 0.177 0.182 0.468 15.852 1.166 0.175 0.591 0.010 0.497 0.113 
Minimum -0.073 6.720 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -2.000 -1.668 0.000 0.693 -0.643 0.271 -0.026 0.000 0.644 
Median -0.002 8.600 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.194 0.025 20.947 2.708 0.037 0.828 -0.001 0.000 1.008 
Maximum 0.051 10.650 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.546 0.469 6.073 71.622 4.812 0.863 4.716 0.013 1.000 1.128 
Notes: This table presents the correlation matrix (panel A) and summary statistics (panel B) of all the variables used in the cross sectional models. CAR(T-1,T0) measures the two day (T-1,T0) cumulative 
abnormal returns from the announcement of a new debt issue. LOGDEBT is the natural logarithm of the debt value to control for the size effect of equity issues on stock price movements; EURO is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the debt was issued in Euros and is 0 otherwise; PRIVATE LOAN is a dummy variable that equals 1 if debt was raised via some private arrangement or credit facilities and is 0 otherwise; 
CONVERT.BOND is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond issue contains a convertibility option and is 0 otherwise. If a bond issue does not have a convertibility option, it is considered a straight bond. 
USE OF FUNDS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the debt was used for growth and is 0 for capital restructuring; 1-OFF ISSUE is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the debt was a 'one-off' 
issue and 0 otherwise; %OFTA is the fraction of the debt value to total assets; OPER.PROFIT controls for operating firm profitability; MTBV is the market-to-book value of the underlying firm; LTDTOTA is long-
term debt to total assets; LOGAGE measures, in log terms, the age of the firm; RUNUP is the cumulative share price return during the period (T-100, T-11) preceding the debt issue announcement; 30DMKTVOL. 
is the realized 30-day volatility of the FTSE 100 index; TSPREADS% is the spread between the 1-month and 30-year gilts; the dummy variable RECESS, which equals 0 for all announcements prior to August 9, 
2007 (N=109) and 1 for the following observations (N=85); and the UK Economic Sentiment Indicator (UKESI) which is disclosed on a monthly basis by the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs. 
*,**,*** denote significance at the 90.0%, 95.0% and 99.0% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5   Explaining abnormal returns 
                     Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
  Issue level Firm level Market 1 Market 2 Full 1 Full 2 
INTERCEPT            -0.0229 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0253 -0.0234 -0.0441 
                     (-1.000) (0.125) (0.189) (-1.631) (-0.939) (-1.401) 
LOGDEBT              0.0022 - - - 0.0030 0.0025 
                     (0.850)    (1.055) (0.876) 
EURO                 -0.0070 ** - - - -0.0066 ** -0.0058 * 
                     (-2.158)    (-1.975) (-1.748) 
PRIVATE LOAN         0.0024 - - - 0.0050 0.0039 
                     (0.626)    (1.227) (0.947) 
CONVERT. BOND     -0.0092 - - - -0.0080 -0.0076 
                     (-1.572)    (-1.303) (-1.225) 
USE OF FUNDS         0.0034 - - - 0.0054 0.0033 
                     (0.874)    (1.374) (0.835) 
1-OFF ISSUE          0.0043 - - - 0.0043 0.0030 
                     (1.382)    (1.269) (0.884) 
%OFTA              - -0.0015 - - -0.0066 -0.0076 
                      (-0.328)   (-0.828) (-0.939) 
OPER.PROFIT     - -0.0005 - - -0.0008 -0.0027 
                      (-0.116)   (-0.111) (-0.379) 
MTBV                 - -0.0031 * - - -0.0026 -0.0021 
                      (-1.818)   (-0.902) (-0.729) 
LTDTOTA              - -0.0001 - - -0.0001 -0.0000 
                      (-0.687)   (-0.827) (-0.440) 
LOGAGE               - -0.0008 - - -0.0000 -0.0006 
                      (-0.719)   (-0.004) (-0.467) 
RUNUP                - - -0.0239 *** -0.0227 *** -0.0214 *** -0.0192 ** 
                       (-3.126) (-3.020) (-2.685) (-2.406) 
30DMKTVOL.      - - 0.0003 -0.0016 0.0010 -0.0022 
                       (0.120) (-0.720) (0.360) (-0.944) 
TSPREADS%            - - 0.0124 -0.0150 -0.0266 0.0046 
                       (0.087) (-0.096) (-0.183) (0.029) 
RECESS            - - -0.0067 * - -0.0101 ** - 
                       (-1.863)  (-2.590)  
UKESI (%)            - -  0.0249 * - 0.0259 * 
                        (1.742)  (1.712) 
F                    1.697 0.749 4.126 4.010 2.034 1.750 
R-squared            5.20% 1.00% 8.00% 7.80% 14.60% 12.90% 
Adj. R-squared       2.10% -1.60% 6.10% 5.90% 7.40% 5.50% 
Sample Size          194 194 194 194 194 194 
Notes: This table presents estimates for the coefficients from regression (6) with heteroskedastic consistent parameter estimates consistent with 
White (1980): CAR(T-1,T0) = α1 + β1LOGDEBT + β2EURO + β3PRIVATELOAN + β4CONVERT.BOND + β5USE OF FUNDS + β61-OFFISSUE  + β7%OFTA + 
β8OPER.PROFIT + β9MTBV + β10LTDTOTA + β11LOGAGE + β12RUNUP + β1330DMKTVOL + β14TSPREADS% + β15RECESS + β16UKESI(%) +  εt. 
CAR(T-1,T0) is the two day (T-1,T0) cumulative abnormal returns arising from the announcement of a new debt issue. LOGDEBT is the natural logarithm 
of the debt; EURO is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the debt was issued in Euros and is 0 otherwise; PRIVATELOAN is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if debt was raised via some private arrangement or credit facilities and is 0 otherwise; CONVERT.BOND is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond 
issue contains a convertibility option and is 0 otherwise. If a bond issue does not have a convertibility option, it is considered a straight bond. USE OF 
FUNDS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the debt was used for growth and is 0 for capital restructuring; 1-OFFISSUE is a dummy variable 
that takes a value of 1 if the debt was a 'one-off' issue and 0 otherwise; %OFTA is the fraction of the debt value to total assets; OPER.PROFIT controls 
for operating firm profitability; MTBV is the market-to-book value of the underlying firm; LTDTOTA is long-term debt to total assets; LOGAGE measures, 
in log terms, the age of the firm; RUNUP is the cumulative share price return during the period (T-100, T-11) preceding the debt issue announcement; 
30DMKTVOL is the realized 30-day volatility of the FTSE 100 index; TSPREADS% is the spread between the 1-month and 30-year gilts; the dummy 
variable RECESS, which equals 0 for all announcements prior to August 9, 2007 (N=109) and 1 for the following observations (N=85); and the UK 
Economic Sentiment Indicator (UKESI). Two-tail t-test results are in parentheses (.).*,**,*** denote significance at the 90.0%, 95.0% and 99.0% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 6   'Single-period' alphas and betas surrounding debt issue announcements 
  Full sample   Non-recessionary   Recessionary   Differences 
      sub-sample    sub-sample    between sub-samples 
 Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Alpha            
αi (alpha)  0.0003*** 0.0004***  0.0005* 0.0005*  0.0001 0.0001  -0.0004* -0.0004* 
αΔi (Δ in alpha) -0.0002* -0.0001  -0.0001 -0.0001  -0.0003* -0.0001  -0.0002* -0.0001 
            
Market risk            
bi (market beta)  0.970*** 0.864***  0.880*** 0.848***  1.086*** 0.942***  0.207*** 0.094** 
bΔi (Δ in market beta) 0.007 0.005   -0.001 -0.030   0.018** 0.026**   0.019** 0.056** 
Notes: The table presents the cross-sectional mean and median values of the estimated coefficients using the CAPM:  rit − rft 
= ai + aΔiDt + bi(rmt − rft) + bΔiD(rmt − rft)t + εt 
The model is estimated from day T– 99 until day T+99 (201 daily observations) where T0 is the day when the debt issue 
announcement took place; D is a dummy variable that equals 1 for t ≥ T0 and 0 otherwise; rit is the daily return on stock i; rft 
is the monthly return on 1-month UK T-bills; rmt is the daily return on the FTSE 100 market  index. Whereas the full sample 
consists of a total of 194 observations, the non-recessionary and recessionary sample consist of 109 and 85 observations, 
respectively. The significance levels of the means and medians are based on a 2-tailed t-test and a 2-tailed Wilcoxon rank 
test, respectively.  
*,**,*** denote significance at the 90.0%, 95.0% and 99.0% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7   Shifts in average stock betas around debt announcements  
Panel A: Full sample (N = 194)  
Event  window   Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard 
deviation 
T-99, T-49 1.0717 1.0883 1.1860 0.9345 0.0685 
T-50, T-1 1.0002 0.9948 1.1821 0.9195 0.0521 
T0, T+5 1.1062 1.1146 1.1420 1.0300 0.0417 
T+6, T+30 1.1422 1.1466 1.2498 1.0714 0.0448 
T+31, T+99 1.2322 1.2400 1.4372 1.0727 0.0967 
Panel B: Non-recessionary sample (N = 109)   
Event  window   Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard 
deviation 
T-99, T-49 0.9945 1.0049 1.1500 0.8053 0.0711 
T-50, T-1 0.9291 0.9197 1.0831 0.8190 0.0542 
T0, T+5 1.0269 1.0404 1.0649 0.9297 0.0491 
T+6, T+30 1.0205 1.0272 1.0651 0.9130 0.0368 
T+31, T+99 1.0858 1.0784 1.2417 0.9919 0.0624 
Panel C: Recessionary sample (N = 85)  
Event  window   Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard 
deviation 
T-99, T-49 1.2168 1.2126 1.3975 1.0309 0.0794 
T-50, T-1 1.1294 1.1231 1.3309 1.0110 0.0674 
T0, T+5 1.2560 1.2605 1.2994 1.2060 0.0362 
T+6, T+30 1.3421 1.3079 1.5759 1.1853 0.1033 
T+31, T+99 1.5461 1.5369 1.7800 1.3315 0.1252 
Notes: This table shows the average changes in time-varying stock betas around new debt issue announcements for 
each of the respective time windows around the announcement date, T0. The betas are estimated for each observation 
from (9) using the dynamic bivariate EGARCH in (7) and (8), and then averaged in order to examine their overall 
behavior around debt announcement periods. The mean, median, maximum, minimum and standard deviation are 
reported for each of the respective time windows for the full sample (panel A), the non-recessionary sample (panel B), 
and the recessionary sample (panel C). Whereas the full sample consists of a total of 194 observations, the non-
recessionary and recessionary sample consist of 109 and 85 observations, respectively. 
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Table 8   Time dummy regressions of beta and alpha around debt announcements 
Panel A: Dependent variable is time-varying beta 
 
Full sample Non-recessionary  
sub-sample  
Recessionary  
sub-sample  
Differences  
between sub-samples 
INTERCEPT 0.995 *** 0.927 *** 1.137 *** 0.210 *** 
  
(17.942
)  (17.701)  (16.208)  (9.785)  
TD(Τ-99,Τ-51) 0.077  0.068  0.081  0.013  
  (1.411)  (1.326)  (1.173)  (0.635)  
TD(Τ-50,Τ-1) 0.002  0.000  -0.010  -0.010  
  (0.044)  (0.004)  (0.151)  (0.489)  
TD(Τ0,Τ5) 0.112 * 0.100 * 0.119 * 0.019  
  (1.935)  (1.805)  (1.671)  (0.724)  
TD(Τ6,Τ30) 0.138 ** 0.088  0.189 ** 0.102 *** 
  (2.419)  (1.614)  (2.590)  (4.116)  
TD(Τ31,Τ99) 0.236 *** 0.158 *** 0.407 *** 0.249 *** 
  (4.183)   (2.974)   (5.697)   (10.950)   
F 70.74  45.88  117.25  76.72  
Adj. R2 62.0%   51.1%   76.3%   63.8%   
Panel B: Dependent variable is time-varying alpha 
 
Full sample Non-recessionary  
sub-sample  
Recessionary  
sub-sample  
Differences  
between sub-samples 
INTERCEPT 0.011 ** 0.019 ** 0.001  -0.019 *   
  (2.404)  (2.199)  (0.338)  (1.940)  
TD(Τ-99,Τ-51) 0.002  -0.002  0.008 *** 0.01  
  (0.518)  (0.226)  (4.826)  (1.038)  
TD(Τ-50,Τ-1) 0.021 *** 0.023 *** 0.018 *** -0.005  
  (4.546)  (2.644)  (11.457)  (0.530)  
TD(Τ0,Τ5) 0.026 *** 0.035 *** 0.014 *** -0.021 **  
  (5.716)  (4.085)  (8.834)  (2.229)  
TD(Τ6,Τ30) 0.030 *** 0.043 *** 0.014 *** -0.028 *** 
  (6.642)  (4.920)  (8.555)  (2.953)  
TD(Τ31,Τ99) 0.032 *** 0.059 *** -0.004 ** -0.063 *** 
  (6.954)   (6.806)   (2.133)   (6.492)   
F 261.66  473.93  131.85  591.15  
Adj. R2 82.9%   84.9%   74.4%   84.6%   
Notes: In panel A of this table, we report OLS regressions of average stock betas estimated from (9) from the bivariate 
EGARCH in (7) and (8) against time dummies (TD) for each of the respective time windows around the announcement 
date, T0. In panel B we do the same for firms' time-varying alphas as described in (11) which represent risk-adjusted 
returns. While the first column reports findings for the full sample, the second and third columns report for the non-
recessionary and recessionary sample periods, respectively. The last column reports differences in the non-recessionary 
and recessionary sample periods. Whereas the full sample consists of a total of 194 observations, the non-recessionary 
and recessionary sample consist of 109 and 85 observations, respectively. 
The two-tail t-test results are presented in parentheses (.). 
*,**,*** denote significance at the 90.0%, 95.0% and 99.0% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9   Time dummy regressions of Treynor ratios around debt announcements 
Dependent Variable: Treynor Ratios 
 
Full sample Non-recessionary  
sub-sample  
Recessionary  
sub-sample  
Differences  
between sub-samples 
INTERCEPT 0.016 * 0.037 ** -0.011 ** -0.048 ** 
  (1.838)  (1.975)  (2.387)  (2.079)  
TD(Τ-99,Τ-51) -0.001  -0.001  0.000  0.000  
  (0.073)  (0.040)  (0.099)  (0.012)  
TD(Τ-50,Τ-1) 0.032 *** 0.048 ** 0.011 ** -0.038  
  (3.689)  (2.582)  (2.218)  (1.625)  
TD(Τ0,Τ5) 0.047 *** 0.072 *** 0.016 *** -0.056 ** 
  (5.516)  (3.860)  (3.235)  (2.431)  
TD(Τ6,Τ30) 0.055 *** 0.088 *** 0.013 ** -0.075 *** 
  (6.418)  (4.705)  (2.585)  (3.234)  
TD(Τ31,Τ99) 0.063 *** 0.127 *** -0.018 *** -0.144 *** 
  (7.428)   (6.775)   (3.523)   (6.176)   
F 639.70  416.97  93.38  240.07  
Adj. R2 87.7%   84.7%   62.7%   80.3%   
Notes: In this table, we report OLS regressions of average time-varying Treynor ratios estimated from (12) against time 
dummies (TD) for each of the respective time windows around the announcement date, T0. While the first column reports 
findings for the full sample, the second and third columns report for the non-recessionary and recessionary sample 
periods, respectively. The last column reports differences in the non-recessionary and recessionary sample periods. 
Whereas the full sample consists of a total of 194 observations, the non-recessionary and recessionary sample consist of 
109 and 85 observations, respectively. 
The two-tail t-test results are presented in parentheses (.). 
*,**,*** denote significance at the 90.0%, 95.0% and 99.0% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
